

**OPERATION SAFE  
STREETS/GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE  
Review and Impact**

December 2004

*submitted by the*  
**Delaware Sentencing Research  
and Evaluation Committee**

*and the*  
**Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission**

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## **Executive Summary**

### **2004 Operation Safe Streets – Governor’s Task Force**

#### **A PUBLIC SAFETY CRISIS**

Operation Safe Streets was initiated during May of 1997 following a dramatic 130 percent increase in the number of shootings that resulted in an injury or death in the City of Wilmington.

This escalation of shootings in Wilmington followed a 19 percent reduction in the number of police officers in 1994 and a simultaneous major reduction in Weed and Seed funds that supported community policing in some of the city’s toughest neighborhoods. These significant changes resulted in a shift from proactive policing to policing that reacted more to 911 calls. As police resources dwindled, illicit drug, robbery and assault related calls for service increased significantly throughout the city. However, the Weed and Seed neighborhoods were the hardest hit, recording a 48 percent increase in serious crime. As Wilmington Police Department resources decreased, police productivity (arrests per officer) actually increased, but could not keep pace with the concomitant increase in violent crime.

The police’s inability to keep up with the increase in violent street crime in 1995 led to an even more critical situation in 1996 when the number of shootings in Wilmington increased from 47 to 108. In retrospect, it is not surprising that more than half of the shooting victims and most of the “shooters” had prior violent and drug sales charges in their criminal histories.

The decaying public safety situation served as a catalyst for initiating a joint project between the New Castle County Police and the Delaware State Police to help the Wilmington Police Department patrol city streets—especially in the summer months. In addition, significant help was provided by Federal law enforcement agencies during this period. As crime subsequently declined in Wilmington, most of the special policing efforts have diminished—except Operation Safe Streets, which still continues and was in fact expanded statewide in 1999 under the auspices of the Delaware State Police in Kent and Sussex counties and the Dover Police Department.

#### **LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROBATION AND SPEEDY COURT DISPOSITIONS**

Operation Safe Streets-Governor’s Task Force (OSS-GTF) is an enhanced law enforcement, probation, and a speedy court initiative that targets high-risk probationers to ensure that they remain in compliance with curfews and other conditions of their probation. At the core of the OSS-GTF are police and probation officer teams that enforce curfews, engage in surveillance activities, and conduct special investigations in targeted high crime areas. Another key element of OSS-GTF is the rapid processing of OSS-GTF cases by Superior Court. In New Castle County, over 50 percent of OSS-GTF cases reach final disposition within 24 hours of arrest via an expedited Superior Court calendar that is held at 11:30 a.m. each court business day. Making probationers aware that justice will be delivered very quickly to those who violate is an integral part of OSS-GTF.

## **OSS-GTF IS MORE THAN CURFEW CHECKS; “COLLATERAL ARRESTS” ARE IMPORTANT TOO**

OSS-GTF is primarily thought of as a special law enforcement program that holds the riskiest offenders in the community accountable to their probation requirement to remain at home and off the streets after 10 p.m. In this way the protagonists and their potential victims are not on the streets during the periods of peak criminal activity.

Another important and sometimes overlooked component of OSS-GTF is the investigative work conducted by police/probation officer teams that result in “collateral arrests.” The importance of OSS-GTF collateral arrests can be seen in the summary statistics—OSS-GTF special investigative work generates more “collateral” arrests than curfew check violations. In fact, 82 percent of the 1,789 arrest attributed directly to OSS-GTF activity in 2003 were “collateral” arrests.

Collateral arrests are arrests made by OSS-GTF police/probation officer teams that result in new charges that were unrelated to a curfew violation. These arrests usually result from special investigations that OSS-GTF teams conduct. In many cases collateral arrests involve persons who are not on probation themselves but who are associates of persons on probation and/or the OSS-GTF caseload.

## **SENTAC IS ENHANCED: VIOLATIONS OF PROBATION INCREASE SHARPLY**

While OSS-GTF is often conceptualized as an aggressive law enforcement strategy it should also be recognized as a significant enhancement to Level III probation. OSS-GTF significantly enhances Level III supervision by introducing greater attention and consequences to probationer curfew checks. Prior to OSS-GTF, curfew non-compliance rarely resulted in a violation of probation.

Level III probation (often referred to as intensive supervision) under the Sentencing Accountability Commission provides eight or more hours of supervision per week and is often used for offenders after release from prison or jail as part of their transition back into the community. It is also used as an initial sentencing alternative for many property offenders that heretofore may have been sentenced to incarceration. Many, and more recently most of the Level III probationers are on the OSS-GTF caseload. As OSS was implemented between 1997 and 1999, probation violation admissions to Department of Correction (Level V and IV) increased by 33 percent, from 2,270 to 3,000 per year.

## **Criminal History Profile of OSS-GTF Probationers**

- The average OSS-GTF probationer has been arrested 19 times.
- Almost half of the arrests were for very serious offenses including:
  - an average of 4.3 prior Title 11 felony arrests;
  - an average of 2.1 prior Title 16 drug sales arrests; and
  - an average of 1.7 prior weapon arrests.
- Almost half of the arrests were for very serious offenses including
- Nine percent (519) of the OSS-GTF caseload has only one or two prior arrests.
- 55 percent of the OSS-GTF caseload is African-American males, 26 percent White males, and 4 percent Hispanic or Latino. 15 percent are females.

## **OSS-GTF and Public Safety**

- OSS in Wilmington is associated with a decrease in shooting incidents that resulted in an injury or death. In 1996 there were 108 of shooting cases; in 2003 there were 44.
- Illicit drug arrests increased by 71 percent between 1996 and 2002 (from 7,074 to 12,089). OSS-GTF is directly responsible for about one-third of these arrests.
- Violent crime has decreased by 3.5 percent between 1996 and 2002 (from 6,010 to 5,797). OSS-GTF's targeting of violent offenders, especially those who are involved in the illicit drug trade, may have helped to preempt some violent crimes.
- Property crime has decreased by 26 percent between 1996 and 2002 (from 36,563 to 29,270).
- While the focus of OSS-GTF is mainly on drug sales and violent crime, it may have also preempted, deterred, or dissuaded some addicted offenders from committing property crimes since many of these offenders were taken off the street earlier than might have otherwise occurred. Other factors like target hardening, private security systems, and community watch groups may have contributed to the reduction in property crime as well.

## **Caseload Size and Relationship with Curfew Compliance**

OSS-GTF initially targeted probationers with illicit drug and weapons arrests in their criminal histories. Since the program was expanded throughout the state, the admission criterion for OSS-GTF has become less restrictive. Current OSS-GTF caseloads include a significant number of Level III probationers with less serious criminal backgrounds. The large increase in persons on the OSS-GTF caseload has lessened the probability that any one probationer on OSS-GTF will have a curfew check. This has likely led to a decrease in the curfew compliance rate.

- The size of the OSS-GTF caseload has increased by 378 percent between 1999 and 2002 from 929 to 3,513 (New Castle County and Wilmington only). The OSS-GTF caseload now exceeds the size of the Level III probation population.
- As the size of the OSS-GTF caseload increased the chance of being subject to a curfew check decreased from 37 percent in 1994 to 12 percent in 2002.
- As the chance of being subject to a curfew check decreased, the compliance rate decreased from 61 percent in 1994 to 55 percent in 2002.

## **OSS-GTF Curfew and Collateral Arrests**

- In 2003, OSS-GTF teams recorded 3,053 curfew violations and made a total of 1,789 arrests; 322 of the arrests were for curfew violations and 1,466 were collateral arrests.
- Curfew violators had a greater chance of being arrested within six months than probationers who were compliant with their curfew—42 percent versus 32 percent. Curfew violators were arrested within 45 days after their missed curfew check on average.
- Collateral arrestees tended to be charged for more serious crimes when compared with curfew check cases. For instance, 39 percent of collateral arrests involved felony charges while only 22 percent of the curfew check cases were arrested on a felony charge, and 42 percent of the curfew check cases involved a violation of probation arrest compared with only 5 percent for collateral cases.
- Collateral arrestees had more serious criminal histories when compared with curfew check cases. Collateral cases had an average of 26 prior arrests in their criminal histories compared with an average of 19 arrests for curfew cases, and the average collateral arrestee has three drug sale arrests in their criminal history compared with one arrest for curfew cases.

## **OSS-GTF Detention and Incarceration Patterns**

- The detention rate for curfew compliant, curfew violators and collateral cases may not appear logical in that curfew compliant probationers, while less likely to be arrested, were detained pre-trial more often than curfew violators or collateral arrests. The detention rate for curfew compliant cases was 79 percent compared with a 70 percent detention rate for curfew violators and collateral cases.
- The number of days detained, however, is consistent with the seriousness of the offense. Curfew compliant arrestees had the least serious arrest charges and remained in pre-trial detention for an average of 22 days. Curfew violators, who are arrested for more serious crimes, remained in pre-trial detention for an average of 29 days. The most serious group, collateral arrestees, remained in detention for an average of 44 days.
- Curfew violators were incarcerated at Level V at a higher rate than collateral cases, even though the collateral arrestees were convicted for more serious crimes and had more extensive criminal histories. Thirty percent of curfew violators were sentenced to Level V compared with 23 percent of collateral cases and 21 percent of curfew compliant cases.
- Time sentenced to Level V, however, is aligned with the seriousness of the offense. Collateral cases received an average Level V sentence of 652 days compared with 261 days for curfew violators and 171 days for curfew compliant offenders.

## **DOC Bed Impact**

- The 1,789 OSS-GTF arrests in 2003 yielded a demand for between 433 (the low estimate) and 667 (the high estimate) Department of Correction detention and incarceration beds.

To calculate the impact of OSS-GTF on DOC beds, the arrest patterns of curfew compliant probationers were used as a baseline for “normal” arrest activity that would have occurred without OSS-GTF. Curfew compliant probationers were used to represent “normal” arrest activity because they come from the same target population as the curfew violators and many of the collateral arrestees, they share similar criminal justice backgrounds and criminal proclivities. Curfew compliant probationers, however, are not normally subject to extra OSS-GTF attention and surveillance. The findings show that some curfew compliant probationers were arrested, but they were not arrested as frequently as curfew violators and collateral cases.

An estimate of the number of arrests that were directly attributable to OSS-GTF arrests was calculated by subtracting the “normal” number of arrests that would have occurred “without OSS-GTF” from the actual number of arrests made in 2002. This difference, along with length of stay information for persons in the July 2002 sample who were detained and/or sentenced to Level V, was used to estimate the DOC bed impact of OSS-GTF arrests.



- If all the statewide OSS-GTF activity in 2002 had similar consequences as the July 2002 sample, all the persons arrested would have accounted for 1,064 detention and incarceration DOC beds. We know this estimate is high because even without OSS-GTF many of these offenders would have still been arrested, detained and sentenced.
- If, without OSS-GTF, all the 2002 OSS-GTF contacts resulted in a similar arrest, detention and incarceration pattern as the curfew compliant probationers in the July 2002 sample, the DOC bed impact would be about 667. For this “what if” scenario, fewer collateral arrests would occur, and they would be arrested, on average, for less serious crimes. This bed impact is considered the high estimate for the OSS-GTF DOC bed impact.
- If, without OSS-GTF, all the 2002 OSS-GTF contacts resulted in similar arrests rates as the curfew complaint group in the July 2002 sample, but were arrested for crimes that match the severity of their current crime and had commensurate (longer) detention and Level V sentences, the DOC bed impact would be about 433.

Either scenario yields a hefty DOC bed impact. DOC beds, however, are not the only cost to the criminal justice system. OSS-GTF requires a significant amount of court resources to insure the speedy disposal of OSS-GTF cases as well as dedicated Department of Correction and police agency personnel needed to staff the OSS-GTF field teams.

The costs associated with OSS-GTF, however, are a tradeoff for the public safety gains in our communities. Many offenders have their criminal careers pre-empted, at least temporarily. Without OSS-GTF, justice would not be so sure or so swift.

## **Operation Safe Streets-Governor's Task Force Introduction**

Operation Safe Streets (OSS) and the Governor's Task Force (GTF) is a statewide crime reduction initiative that targets high-risk probationers to ensure that they remain in compliance with curfews and other conditions of their probation. At the core of Operation Safe Streets and the Governor's Task Force are police and probation/parole officer teams who enforce probationer curfews, engage in surveillance activities, and conduct special investigations in targeted high crime areas. Operation Safe Streets police/probationer officer teams limit their activities to Wilmington and Dover, while the Governor's Task Force covers the remainder of New Castle, Kent and Sussex counties.

Operation Safe Streets originally came about in response to a sharp increase in the number of shooting incidents in Wilmington that occurred in 1996. A study prepared jointly by the Delaware Statistical Analysis Center and the Criminal Justice Council entitled "*Wilmington Shootings 1996—A Comparative Study of Victims and Offenders in Wilmington, Delaware*" found that a majority of the shooting suspects and victims had prior arrests for a violent felony, drugs or weapons, and that many were on probation when the shooting occurred.

In May 1997, former Governor Thomas Carper created the "Governor's Task Force on Violent Crime" to improve coordination between the Wilmington Police Department, the Department of Correction, and the Division of Youth Rehabilitative Services. Two months later, Wilmington's Operation Safe Streets initiative was launched. Shooting incidents in Wilmington fell by 32 percent the following year. Wilmington's positive experience with Operation Safe Streets led to the program's expansion in 1999 to include New Castle County, Kent County, Sussex County, and the City of Dover.

Since 1999, the Delaware Statistical Analysis Center has provided summary reports for Operation Safe Streets and the Governor's Task Force (OSS-GTF), the most recent being "*Operation Safe Streets Governor's Task Force 2002 Interim Report, December 2002*". These reports focused mainly on operational statistics including the number of curfew checks, the number of collateral arrests, the amount and types of illicit drugs and the number of firearms seized. In addition the reports provided updates on shooting incidents in the City of Wilmington that resulted in an injury or a death.

While helpful, these reports did not address important questions that were raised by the Sentencing Accountability Commission and more recently the Sentencing Research and Evaluation Committee (HB 300 Section 71). The questions from these committees regard a need for more systemic information about the program's operations, the offenders' criminal justice activities and the program's impact on DOC beds. For instance, what is the criminal history profile for OSS-GTF offenders? Once a person comes into contact with an OSS-GTF team what is the likelihood that this contact will lead to arrest and detention? If an offender is not in compliance with the curfew check or absconds, how long does it take for an offender to be arrested? What percentage of the OSS-GTF offenders eventually serve Level V jail or prison terms? In addition,

there is a belief that OSS-GTF reduces crime and increases public safety. To what extent does historical crime information support this assertion?

### **It wasn't just a good idea; Wilmington had a serious problem**

For years, the Wilmington Police Department focuses much of its efforts towards eliminating open-air drug markets and reducing drug related violent crime in neighborhoods where these problems were most prevalent. The number of shooting incidents in Wilmington that resulted in an injury or a death reached a high of 108 shootings in 1996; however, street crime in the city actually began to spiral out of control two years earlier in 1994. That year, two things occurred that seriously challenged public safety efforts in the City of Wilmington. First, manpower in the Wilmington Police Department decreased by 19 percent, from 289 sworn officers to 235. Secondly, federal funding for Operation Weed and Seed in the city's Hilltop and West Center City neighborhoods (two of the city's most troubled areas in terms of street level illicit drug sales and violent crime) decreased by about two-thirds from a peak of approximately one million dollars a year.

One consequence of the concomitant reduction of city and federal funding for the Wilmington Police Department was the shift from proactive community policing to a more reactive response to citizen complaints via "911" calls for police service. To absorb this reduction in manpower, the police department's community service division was dismantled. Furthermore, the very significant public safety and quality of life gains that were made in Wilmington's Weed and Seed target neighborhoods were lost.

As police resources dwindled, drug, robbery and assault related calls for service increased significantly throughout the city. The Weed and Seed neighborhoods were hit the hardest as drug related calls increased by 48 percent. Unfortunately, as calls for service related to illicit drugs spiked in these neighborhoods, the police department's ability to respond declined and arrests for illicit drugs decreased by 21 percent (DeISAC: Evaluation of Weed and Seed, September 1999). This counterproductive trend continued on into 1995, and violent crime escalated into shootings that resulted in an injury or death, not surprisingly, mostly in the tougher neighborhoods. Shooting incidents resulting in injury or death increased from 47 in 1995 to 107 in 1996 and 108 in 1997. In most of these new firearm related cases both the shooter and the victim had prior violent felony and drug sales arrests in their criminal histories (DeISAC/CJC 1997).

The decaying public safety situation served as a catalyst for enhanced policing efforts involving a series of special operations. Extra patrol officers from the New Castle County Police Department and the Delaware State Police were reassigned to Wilmington to help them deal with the increase in crime during the summer months. In addition, other special assistance and extra manpower was provided by federal agencies, including the FBI, DEA, ATF, the U.S. Marshall and the Secret Service. While many of these special policing efforts have diminished over time, Operation Safe Streets, which started in July 1997, still continues

## **Tighter surveillance for the riskiest probationers**

While the main purpose of Operations Safe Streets and the Governor's Task Force was to help address the urgent public safety issue, especially shooting incidents that resulted in an injury or death, it also played a less obvious but important role of providing increased surveillance for the Sentencing Accountability Commission's (SENTAC) Level III probationers. Level III was designed as an alternative to incarceration for many felony property offenders. However, the Level III probation population also includes offenders who have violated their Level II probation and offenders who are sentenced to a "transitional" Level III term following their release from jail or prison. Under SENTAC's guidelines, Level III probation is referred to as "intensive probation" and it requires eight or more hours of supervision per week.

The typical probationer selected for Wilmington OSS or New Castle County GTF is on Level III probation and has an arrest record that includes violent felony, drug or weapon related offenses. Level III probationers with less serious criminal backgrounds may also be admitted to OSS or GTF if their probation officer believes that the probationer needs closer supervision. Probationers selected for OSS or GTF are subject to unannounced curfew checks and increased surveillance of their activities.

A goal of OSS-GTF is to keep at-risk offenders, as well as their potential "victims", off the streets and at home during the hours when they are most likely to become involved in incidents that could result in shootings or other violence. Curfew for OSS-GTF probationers starts at 10 p.m. If a probationer misses their curfew, the person who answers the door is informed that the probationer should contact their probation officer as soon as possible. Missing a curfew once or twice doesn't necessarily lead to a violation of probation arrest. Probationers who aren't home at curfew and don't have a valid excuse for not being at home can be arrested at the officer's discretion; however, in many cases they are just given a verbal warning. In cases where an OSS-GTF probationer is arrested, the probation officer will usually issue an administrative warrant. These special warrants allow the Department of Correction to hold a violated probationer until their court hearing, which are scheduled no later than 48 hours after their arrests.

## **OSS-GTF places emphasis on Special Investigations**

Another very important component of OSS-GTF is the investigative work that OSS-GTF teams perform in the field that result in "collateral" arrests. In fact OSS-GTF "collateral" investigative activity generates many more arrests than curfew checks do. Investigative information may be obtained while conducting curfew checks and through "street contacts" with associates of probationers and other confidential informants.

Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF police/probation officer teams may stop suspicious persons for questioning and will try to solicit information from the persons they question about illegal activities that are going on in the general area. In many cases the individual questioned is on probation, which affords the OSS-GTF teams more leverage. Information obtained

this way often leads to more significant collateral arrests. Arrests made by OSS-GTF teams that are not associated with a failed curfew check are recorded as collateral arrests.

Table 1 compares VOP/curfew check arrests made by OSS-GTF with collateral arrests. The number of VOP/curfew check arrests associated with curfew (and other) violations, while significant, is small in comparison to the OSS-GTF collateral arrests that resulted from special investigations. As Table 1 shows, between 1999 and 2003, about 75 percent of all the arrests associated with OSS-GTF are collateral arrests. In 2003, there were 1,466 OSS-GTF collateral arrests, which accounted for 82 percent of the OSS-GTF arrest activity.

<b>Table 1: OSS-GTF Arrests</b>					
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total OSS-GTF Arrests	1,270	1,410	1,358	1,510	1,789
VOP/Curfew Check Arrests	251	454	409	404	323
Collateral Arrests	1,019	956	949	1,106	1,466
% Collateral Arrests	82.1%	67.8%	69.9%	73.2%	81.9%

It is noteworthy that in the years following the implementation of OSS-GTF, there was a 30 percent increase in the number of offenders being sentenced to jail (one year or less term) and prison (greater than a one year term) for a violation of probation. In 1997 there were 2,500 offenders incarcerated for a violation of probation and by 1999 there were 3,250 (DeLSAC August 2003). Of course there are other sources of violation of probation admissions that might have contributed to this increase, such as regular SENTAC probation violators, fast track violators, and drug court violators. However, these other causes for violation of probation incarcerations were implemented years before OSS-GTF and their activity had already peaked by the time OSS-GTF was implemented.

### **Superior Court’s role in OSS-GTF**

The Superior Court is an active and efficient partner for the OSS-GTF program. Swift justice is one of the key characteristics of the OSS-GTF program. Without the court’s partnership with OSS-GTF, the OSS-GTF cases would be put on the judicial calendars with many other types of cases leading to delays that would seriously detract from the “public safety” priority of OSS-GTF.

New Castle County Superior Court uses a special expedited calendar to handle OSS-GTF court cases exclusively. Operation Safe Streets hearings (which handle both Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF cases) are held Monday thru Friday starting at 11:30 a.m. Dispositions for these cases are usually made within 24 hours after the arrest except in cases where the arrest takes place on a weekend. When an arrest occurs on a weekend, an administrative warrant is issued by J.P. Court so the defendant can be detained until the following Monday. New Castle

County Superior Court records show that 50 percent of OSS-GTF cases are disposed at the initial hearing.


The manner in which OSS and GTF cases are handled depends on whether the defendant was arrested for violating his probation only or whether the arrest involved an additional felony charge. In cases where an OSS or GTF probationer was arrested for a violation of probation only, the probationer is violated and sentenced at the initial hearing or is placed on the calendar of the judge who gave the original sentence. In cases where an OSS or GTF probationer is arrested on a felony charge in addition to the probation violation (collateral arrests), the defendants are usually arraigned on the probation violation first, after which they are scheduled for a “fast track” hearing and bail is set. Defendants who choose to contest the allegations are placed on a special contested fast track calendar. Depending on the number of charges involved and the nature of the charges, fast track defendants can be sentenced for violating probation and detained on the additional charge(s) or the defendants are sentenced for VOP and any additional charges at the same time.

According to statistics provided by the New Castle County Superior Court, 534 Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF cases were heard in New Castle County Superior Court between January 1 and December 17, 2003. Using arrest statistics provided by the Delaware State Police and the Department of Correction, it is estimated that 95 (17.8 percent) of the 534 OSS-GTF court cases were for curfew check violations and the remaining 439 court cases (82.2 percent) were for collateral arrests. Probationers accounted for an estimated 57 percent of OSS-GTF court cases that resulted from collateral arrests (see Figure 1).


The dispositions of the OSS-GTF court cases are shown in Figure 2. Defendants were violated and sentenced immediately in 266 (50 percent) of the 534 OSS-GTF court cases. Another 24 OSS-GTF defendants (5 percent) were violated but were either continued on probation or were discharged. Many of these cases were disposed within 15 hours after the defendant was arrested.

190 (36 percent) of the remaining cases were not sentenced immediately because the case involved a felony and was transferred to a fast track calendar. In 41 cases (8 percent) the hearing was put off until later because the probationer either contested the alleged violation or the judge at the OSS-GTF hearing sent the probationer back to his last sentencing judge for the violation of probation proceeding. Of the remaining 13 cases, seven were continued to another date, four were dismissed, and in two cases the dispositions were not found.

**Figure 1**  
**OSS and GTF Cases in New Castle County Superior Court**  
**January 1 thru December 17, 2003**




**Figure 2**  
**OSS and GTF New Castle County Superior Court Case Dispositions**  
**January 1 thru December 17, 2003**



## Operation Safe Streets-Governor’s Task Force and Public Safety

The Delaware Statistical Analysis Center reports on OSS-GTF activities show that the number of violation of probation arrests for curfew violations and “collateral” arrests associated with OSS-GTF have increased each year. In 1999, 1,270 arrests, statewide were attributed to OSS-GTF. By 2003, the number OSS-GTF arrests had increased to 1,789, an increase of 41 percent. As the number of OSS-GTF arrests increased, adult illicit drug arrests increased by 71 percent between 1998 and 2003, from 7,074 to 12,089. Law enforcement attributes a significant amount of the increase in illicit drug arrests to OSS-GTF. In fact, OSS-GTF activity may explain up to one-third of the statewide increase in drug arrests.

As Figure 3 shows, reported violent crimes across the state decreased by 3.5 percent between 1996 and 2002. An argument can be made that OSS-GTF activities are preemptive in terms of violent crime: that is, increased surveillance and proactive law enforcement investigations can help catch criminals before they can commit new crimes. However, the extent to which OSS-GTF reduces violent crime should be balanced against its contribution to violent crime statistics. For example, 9 percent of the arrests related to curfew violations and 14 percent of the collateral arrests involve a violent crime or a firearm (see page 22). Therefore, while OSS-GTF activities appear to have preempted violent crime to a degree, they also account for some of the violent crime statistics.





More impressive than the decrease in violent crime is the reduction in the number of reported Part I property crimes (burglary, felony theft, auto theft, and arson), which decreased by 26 percent from 36,563 in 1996 to 29,270 in 2002. While an argument could be made that OSS-GTF activities have contributed to a decrease in property crimes such as burglary and theft because preemptive investigations may have dissuaded some addicted offenders from stealing to get funds to live on and buy drugs, the impact of OSS-GTF appears to be too small (a 1 to 4 ratio) to be the sole cause for the reduction in property crime. The influence of OSS-GTF activity on property crime rates, however, cannot be discounted. It may well be, however, that “target hardening” such as improved locks, bars, private security systems and community watch programs also have a lot to do with the decrease in property crime.

Other positive impacts on public safety associated with OSS-GTF are the seizures of substantial amounts of illicit drugs and firearms. For instance, between 1999 and 2003, OSS-GTF teams statewide seized 4,696 grams of powder cocaine, 9,689 grams of crack, 959 grams of heroin, 216 grams of methamphetamine, and 138,669 grams of marijuana. In addition 364 firearms and 263 other weapons have been seized.

Not to be overlooked is the deterrent effect that OSS-GTF has had on the “street subculture”. Probationers, most of whom had substantial criminal histories, as well as their associates, are more accountable for their behavior than ever before. The increased accountability for the most criminally prone citizens may have had a role in recent reductions in reported crime.

### **Operation Safe Streets and shootings in Wilmington**


In the year prior to the launch of Operation Safe Streets, the city of Wilmington experienced an unprecedented increase in shooting incidents that resulted in an injury or a death. In the year after Operation Safe Streets was launched, shootings in the city decreased by 31.8 percent, from 107 shootings in 1997 to 73 shootings in 1998 (see Figure 4). In fact, shootings in the city decreased for three consecutive years following the program’s start, eventually reaching a low point of 60 shootings in 2000. In 2002, the number of reported shooting incidents rose again to 88, followed by a 50 percent drop to 44 shootings in 2003.

Figure 5 compares Wilmington shooting incidents pre and post Operation Safe Streets. The graph shows the number of shooting incidents that occurred in Wilmington between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003 aggregated by quarter. Two regression lines showing trends for the pre and post OSS periods are superimposed over the graph. The chart shows that between January 1996 and June 1997, before OSS was implemented in Wilmington, shooting incidents in the city were occurring at a rate of 27.5 per quarter. The regression line clearly shows that shootings were on the increase during this period. After OSS was implemented in July 1997, and until the end of 2003, shootings in the city occurred at an average of 16.6 per quarter and the regression line shows a downward trend for this period overall.

**Figure 4**  
**Wilmington Shootings Resulting in Injury or Death**  
**January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2003**

Year	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Total
1996	18	26	39	25	108
1997	18	39	25	25	107
1998	18	15	20	20	73
1999	13	8	14	21	56
2000	8	15	22	15	60
2001	13	13	21	14	61
2002	23	20	13	32	88
2003	10	12	13	9	44

**Figure 5**  
**Wilmington Shootings Pre-OSS vs. Post OSS**



## Detailed Study Of OSS-GTF Caseload Parameters

This section of the report examines various operational aspects of the OSS-GTF, including profiles of OSS-GTF probationers, activities that the OSS-GTF teams engage in while out in the field, and the impact of OSS-GTF on arrest, detention, sentence length, and incarceration.

Case activity files maintained in the Department of Correction probation and parole office in Wilmington provide the most readily accessible window into OSS-GTF operations. This database contains a record for each probationer admitted into Wilmington OSS or New Castle GTF at least once since the program's inception. It contains personal information about the probationer (name, race, birth date, SBI number) as well as case management information (admission date, discharge date, reason for discharge).

The original database file contained 6,742 entries for 5,942 probationers. In order to make the database file useful, the SBI numbers for the probationers in the database had to be verified and some probationer names had to be corrected. In cases where the SBI number was missing or incomplete, the SBI number had to be researched manually using the state CJIS system. The SBI numbers were not found in 37 cases. After the corrections were made, the DOC database contained 5,733 persons. A criminal history and demographic profile was prepared for cases where this information was available.

In addition to the Department of Correction database, a one-month sample of OSS-GTF contacts was used to estimate the full criminal justice system parameters. Linking detailed criminal history, detention and Level V incarceration information for all 5,733 persons in the Department of Correction's OSS-GTF database was prohibitive. Instead, OSS-GTF contact forms were used to prepare the in-depth section of this study. Contact forms are used by OSS-GTF probation officers to document events that may occur while they are out in the field. For example, a contact form is filled out when a curfew check is made, when someone is arrested, or when a person is questioned or searched. A total of 524 contact forms were in the July 2002 sample.

The July 2002 sample was subject to more extensive analysis than probationers in the full DOC OSS-GTF database. First, the SBI numbers for the persons in the sample group were re-verified and criminal history profiles were prepared. In the next step, the sample cases were broken out into three main groups: 1) contacts relating to compliant curfew checks (curfew checks where the subject was home at curfew); 2) contacts relating to non-compliant curfew checks (curfew checks where the subject was not at home); and, 3) contacts that resulted in a collateral arrest.

The criminal records of probationers who had compliant and non-compliant curfew checks were researched to determine if they were arrested in the six-month period following their July 2002 curfew check. Those who were arrested had their cases tracked via JIC docket files and sentencing orders to determine if they had been detained or were sentenced to Level V. Likewise, collateral arrests from the July 2002 sample were tracked to determine the length of time that they were detained or sentenced to Level V.

It is from this very extensive process that the type and number of OSS-GTF contacts, subsequent criminal activity, subsequent detention, activity, court hearings, sentencing and finally incarceration was established for the July 2002 sample group.

**OSS-GTF Admissions**

Most Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF probationers are on Level III supervision. Probationers selected for Wilmington OSS or New Castle County GTF are admitted to into the program either at intake into DOC community corrections or via referral by their probation or parole officer. Most OSS-GTF probationers have prior arrests for violent crimes, weapons, or sale or possession of illicit drugs. They can also be selected for OSS-GTF based on their affiliation with existing OSS or GTF probationers or if they exhibit behaviors that would indicate that they should be monitored more closely than other Level III probationers are monitored.

According to the Department of Correction OSS-GTF database, 5,733 probationers were admitted to Wilmington OSS or New Castle County GTF at least once between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2002. Of the 5,733 probationers who entered the program during this period, 943 (16 percent) were admitted into OSS or GTF more than once.

At the end of December 2002, there were 3,500 active OSS and GTF cases, 1,118 (32 percent) in Wilmington OSS and the remaining 2,382 cases (68 percent) in New Castle County GTF. Table 2 shows the number of active Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF cases per year from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2002. Both Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF saw a sharp increase in caseloads between 1999 and 2001. In 2002, the number of open Wilmington OSS cases stabilized while the number of open New Castle County GTF cases continued to increase. The reason for this difference was that New Castle County GTF cases remained open for longer periods on average than Wilmington OSS cases did.

<b>Table 2: Caseloads of Wilmington OSS vs. New Castle County GTF</b>						
Year	Wilmington OSS			New Castle County GTF		
	Cases Opened	Cases Closed	Year's End Population	Cases Opened	Cases Closed	Year's End Population
1999	1,009	577	515	688	295	396
2000	806	532	789	820	171	1,045
2001	794	489	1,094	881	116	1,810
2002	614	590	1,118	648	76	2,382

### OSS-GTF percentage of Level III Probation caseload

As Table 3 shows, the Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF caseloads increased from 929 in 1999 to 3,513 in 2002. The table shows that in 2001 the number of active OSS-GTF probationers increased to the point where it exceeded the DOC Level III caseload. In 2002 there were 1,057 more persons on the OSS-GTF caseload than there were on the DOC Level III caseload (regular plus day reporting center). Therefore many persons who “flowed down” from Level III to a lower supervision level (and maybe even who were assigned to higher levels of supervision or even incarceration) remained on the list of the active OSS-GTF target population. The growth in the number of active OSS-GTF cases is indicative of either a broadening of the criteria for inclusion in the OSS-GTF caseload or poor record keeping.

	1999	2000	2001	2002
Wilmington & NCC OSS-GTF Target Population	929	1,847	2918	3,513
Wilmington & NCC DOC Level III Caseload	2,123	2,265	2332	2,456
OSS-GTF percent of Level III Caseload	43.8%	81.5%	125.1%	143.0%

When OSS-GTF was first implemented in 1997, the goal was to include probationers with violent criminal histories who were involved in the illicit drug trade and were likely to be armed. This “tighter” criterion was influenced by the findings in *Wilmington Shooting 1996* (DeISAC and CJC 1997), which showed that the increase in shootings resulting in injury and death was associated with offenders and victims with a history of violent crime, illicit drug sales, and possession of firearms. Since then, the target population has expanded to include all of the Level III probation caseload as well as offenders who were previously on Level III but were reassigned to a lower or higher level of surveillance. This means that the OSS-GTF program had evolved from a program that targets the “most dangerous actors on surveillance” to much broader criteria that included anyone who either is currently on Level III (in the case of Wilmington OSS) or was previously on Level III (in the case of New Castle County GTF). In addition, special probation groups, such as the sex offender, have been added to the OSS-GTF caseload.

### Length of stay in OSS-GTF

Wilmington OSS probationers stayed in the program for an average of 349 days before their cases were closed out compared with an average of 557 days for New Castle County GTF probationers. In cases where a closing date was available, the average number of days in the program was 180 days for OSS probationers, compared to 181 days for GTF probationers. In cases without a close date, the average time in the program for was 697 days for OSS probationers and 665 days for GTF probationers.

## Reasons for closing OSS-GTF cases

One out of every four OSS-GTF cases was closed because the probationer was reassigned from Level III probation to Level 1 or Level 2. Seventy-six percent of the cases were closed because the probationers were reassigned to a higher or lower supervision level, they were discharged from probation altogether, or their probation officer violated them. Other reasons for closing out cases are shown in Table 4.

	No.	Pct.		No.	Pct.
1. Flow down to lower supervision level	767	26.1%	8. Criminal conviction	83	2.8%
2. Moved to higher supervision level	479	16.3%	9. Probationer absconded	62	2.1%
3. Discharged from probation/parole	400	13.6%	10. Work conflict	51	1.7%
4. Technical Violation	383	13.0%	11. Probationer deceased	32	1.1%
5. Probationer moved	267	9.1%	12. Whereabouts unknown	21	<1%
6. Other probation violation	217	7.4%	13. Interstate transfer	17	<1%
7. Officer's discretion	181	6.2%	14. Intrastate transfer	9	<1%

1. Flow down to lower supervision level - the probationer was reassigned from supervision Level III to supervision Level 2 or Level 1.
2. Moved to a higher supervision level - the probationer was reassigned from supervision Level III to supervision Level 4 or Level V.
3. Discharged from probation or parole - the probationer finished serving his or her term of probation and was released from DOC supervision.
4. Technical violation - the probationer missed appointments with his/her probation officer, tested positive for drug use, or violated some other condition of their supervision. As a result, the probationer was violated and was reassigned to a higher supervision level.
5. Probationer moved - the probationer moved to another state.
6. Other probation violation.
7. Officer's discretion - the probationer is discharged from OSS-GTF at the request of his or her probation officer.
8. Criminal conviction - the probationer was convicted on another charge and was sentenced to Level 4 or Level V.
9. Probationer absconded - the probationer moved to another address or fled the state without notifying DOC of his whereabouts.
10. Work conflict - the probationer's work schedule conflicts with their curfew.
11. Probationer deceased.
12. Whereabouts unknown.
13. Interstate transfer - the probationer's case was transferred to another DOC office in Delaware.
14. Intrastate transfer - the probationer's case was transferred to another state.

## Crime profile Of OSS-GTF probationers

Criminal history information was found for 5,699 of the 5,733 probationers who were admitted to Wilmington OSS or New Castle County GTF at least once. OSS and GTF probationers had an average of 19 arrests in their Delaware arrest history, including all felony, misdemeanor, DUI and driving with a suspended or revoked license arrests. As Table 5 shows, many (but not all) of the probationers in the Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF caseload have a significant criminal background in violence, weapons, and illicit drugs.


	# with at least one charge in Criminal History	% with at least one charge in Criminal History	Avg. charges per offender
Title 11 Felony Total	5,011	85.0%	4.3
Title 11 Violent Felony	3,731	63.3%	2.4
Title 11 Weapon	2,329	39.5%	1.7
Title 16 Drug Total	3,923	66.7%	2.9
Title 16 Drug Violent Felony	2,861	48.4%	2.1
Total Arrests	5,699	100.0%	19.2

Likewise, while the average (mean) number of prior arrests is high (19 arrests per offender) there are a significant number of cases with less extensive arrest histories. A frequency distribution of the number of times that Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF probationers were arrested in Delaware is shown in Figure 6.

## Demographic profile of OSS-GTF probationers

The ethnicity and gender characteristics of OSS and GTF probationers are shown in Table 6. Fifty-five percent of the cases where ethnicity and gender information was available were African-American males, 26 percent were White males, 9 percent were African-American females, 6 percent were White females, and 4 percent were Hispanic males. The average age of OSS-GTF probationers when their case was opened was 31 years old.

**Figure 6**  
**Number of Arrests in Delaware for OSS and GTF Probationers**



**Table 6: OSS-GTF Probationers by Ethnicity and Gender**

Race/Ethnicity	Male		Female		Total	
	No.	Pct	No.	Pct	No.	Pct
African-American	3,142	54.8%	529	9.2%	3,671	64.0%
White	1,460	25.5%	327	5.7%	1,787	31.2%
Hispanic/Latino	253	4.4%	18	0.3%	271	4.7%
Other	4	0.1%	0	0.0%	4	0.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,859</b>	<b>85.6%</b>	<b>874</b>	<b>15.4%</b>	<b>5,733</b>	<b>100.0%</b>



**If they don't catch you now,  
OSS-GTF increases the chances that they will catch you later**

A person on the OSS-GTF caseload who is not compliant with their curfew has about a 30 percent greater chance of being arrested within the next six months than a probationer who is home during a curfew check. An OSS-GTF team accounts for two-thirds of the “extra arrests” related to a failed curfew check <sup>1</sup>. Curfew violators who are not apprehended immediately have an OSS-GTF administrative warrant or a *capias* “flag” on their record which alerts law enforcement on routine policing operations to the person’s violator status. It usually does not take very long for the police to catch up with an OSS-GTF violator. The average time from the missed curfew check to the initial arrest is between 40 and 45 days.

**OSS-GTF contributes to the significant increase in Violation of Probations**

One of the fastest growing segments of the criminal justice population is violation of probation cases. A number of reasons account for this growth, including SENTAC sentencing guidelines, Fast Track, and Drug Courts. OSS-GTF introduced another way of increasing the number of probation violations by raising the status of a curfew violation from a minor issue that was not likely to result in a violation of probation to a significant issue where it could. All of these programs or policy initiatives have contributed to the increasing number of offenders on probation, especially Levels III and IV, because they have increased surveillance in the community and established other requirements for successful completion. While these approaches have enabled Delaware to place otherwise jail and prison bound offenders in the community, they have also increased the likelihood that violation of probations would occur. Senate Bill 50, the Probation Reform Bill, is an effort to ameliorate the impact of the increasing number of violations of probations.

Department of Correction OSS-GTF statistics show that 404 violation of probation arrests were made statewide in 2002. In the July 2002 sample group of OSS-GTF contacts, 42 percent of the initial arrests that occurred after their July 2002 curfew check were for violation of probation only.

This count underestimates the actual number of probation violations because a “violation of probation only” does not take into account situations where a “Fast Track” violation of probation takes place. A Fast Track violation occurs when someone who is on probation commits a new crime and is detained and sentenced initially for the violation of probation. In cases where there is not an immediate plea, the trial for the new crime takes place at a later date.


The impact of OSS-GTF probation violations on case processing is considerable. When OSS-GTF violations of probation cases that involved arrests made by OSS-GTF police/probation officer teams are combined with cases where OSS-GTF probation violators were arrested by “stan-

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<sup>1,2</sup> Details on how these statistics were calculated can be found on page 40.

ard” police efforts, the estimated number of OSS-GTF violation of probation arrests per year statewide could be as high 730<sup>2</sup>. Considering that about 75 percent of these cases end up in detention, even if for only a short period of time, OSS-GTF cases could account for about 15 percent of all detained violation of probation cases.

However, OSS-GTF’s accounting for 15 percent of the detained VOPs in the state is a very conservative estimate. For instance, The New Castle County Superior Court OSS-GTF report shows that 36 percent OSS-GTF cases are “VOP Fast Track” cases. This exemplifies the degree of interaction between OSS-GTF and the fast track process. A Fast Track case involves both a violation of probation and a new felony charge. The defendant is usually arraigned on the violation of probation first, after which the felony is scheduled for a “Fast Track” hearing and bail is set. If the case “slows down” the defendant may be incarcerated on the companion VOP while the he is detained on the felony charge. Many of the OSS-GTF collateral arrests eventually become VOP Fast Track cases.



## **OSS and GTF Curfew Checks, Arrests, Detentions, and Sentencings**

This section of the report examines in detail the curfew check, arrest, detention, and sentencing patterns for Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF contacts. The information provided in this section is based on a case-by-case review of OSS-GTF contact forms for July 2002. The Department of Correction probation and parole office in Wilmington provided the contact forms. It should be noted that the Department of Correction had no prior knowledge of the time period that was selected for this study.

Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF probation officers documented 524 contacts in July 2002. Of the 524 contact forms in the July 2002 sample,

- 362 (69 percent) were used to record curfew checks,
- 121 (23 percent) were used to document collateral arrests, and
- 36 forms (7 percent) documented instances where OSS-GTF officers stopped suspects for questioning but the contact didn't lead to any further action.
- New Castle County GTF officers also issued five summonses for minor offenses (1 percent).

### **OSS-GTF Curfew Checks**

A key objective of Operation Safe Streets and the Governor's Task Force is to ensure that probationers in the program remain in compliance with their 10 p.m. curfew. The curfew requirement is designed to keep the most dangerous Level III probationers at home and off the streets during the hours when they are most likely to become involved in altercations or other situations that can escalate into violence. OSS-GTF teams conduct curfew checks starting at 10 p.m. and continue until approximately 12 a.m.

OSS-GTF probation officers maintain several loose-leaf notebooks to help them select probationers to check during a shift. Each page of the notebook includes a profile of individual OSS-GTF probationers, their home address, description and photograph. The notebooks include OSS-GTF probationers who reside within a zip code (for Wilmington) or a geographic area (for New Castle County).


The decision as to who gets checked depends largely whether the probationer resides within the zip code or geographic area that the OSS-GTF teams decide to cover on a given night since they usually limit their curfew checks to two or three zip codes or housing developments where probationers are clustered. An area may be targeted on a particular night because OSS-GTF teams may have received a tip from an informant about a specific probationer who lives there or information about illegal activities occurring in the area, or they haven't visited the area in a while. In

some cases, OSS-GTF curfew checks are coordinated to assist with other police initiatives like Operation Weed and Seed in Wilmington's West Center City neighborhood. Curfew checks require that the OSS or GTF probation officer meets face-to-face with the probationer at their residence after the 10 p.m. curfew. During the curfew check, the officers can question the probationer and walk through their residence to check for evidence of any suspicious activity. If something in the residence seems suspicious, the probation officer can call his or her supervisor to request an administrative search warrant, which gives them permission to conduct a more thorough search of the residence.

Figure 8 shows that the curfew compliance rate for Wilmington OSS and New Castle GTF reached a high of 61 percent in 1999, but in 2002 the compliance rate had dropped to 55 percent. The July 2002 sample of contact forms is consistent with this lower compliance rate. Based on the sample of contact forms, 362 curfew checks were made in July 2002. Wilmington OSS made 193 curfew checks, of which 112 (58 percent) were compliant and 81 (42 percent) were not compliant. New Castle GTF made 169 curfew checks in July 2002, of which 94 (56 percent) were complaint and 75 (44 percent) were not compliant.

The 362 curfew checks made in July 2002 involved 237 OSS-GTF probationers. 112 (47 percent) of the probationers in the sample were with Wilmington OSS and 125 (53 percent) were with New Castle County GTF. Sixty-nine (29 percent) of the 237 probationers in the sample had more than one curfew check during the month. Repeat visits during the month were mostly limited to probationers who were not at home when the previously curfew check was made.

**Figure 8**  
**Compliant and Non-compliant Curfew Checks**  
**New Castle County GTF and Wilmington OSS**  
**January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2002**




The increasing caseload of active OSS and GTF probationers decreased the likelihood that an OSS or GTF probationer would be subject to a curfew check. Using the number of OSS and GTF curfew checks shown in Figure 8 compared with the number of active cases, Figure 9 shows that the number of curfew checks remains relatively constant from 1999 to 2002 as the number of active cases increased.


Overall, the probability of that an OSS or GTF probationer would be subject to a curfew check decreased from 37 percent in 1999 to 12 percent in 2002. This decrease was even more pronounced for New Castle County GTF probationers. The probability that a GTF probationer would be subject to a curfew check decreased from 40 percent in 1999 to 8 percent in 2002.

**Probability of arrest following a curfew check**

The criminal history records of the probationers in the sample were reviewed to determine if any were arrested in the six month period after their July 2002 curfew check, and if so, why they were arrested. Ninety (38 percent) of the 237 probationers in sample were arrested at least once before year's end.

Twenty (22 percent) of the 90 arrested OSS-GTF probationers were arrested for a felony offense. The remaining 68 probationers were arrested for violation of probation, misdemeanor, and traffic offenses. Figure 10 shows the offenses that the arrested probationers were charged with.





One important difference between curfew compliant and non-compliant probationers was that non-compliant probationers were re-arrested at a higher rate than compliant probationers. Fifty-seven (42 percent) of the 135 probationers who missed their curfew during July 2002 were arrested within six months. In comparison, 33 (32 percent) of the 102 probationers who were compliant with their curfew were arrested within six months.

It takes about five weeks for the police to catch up with curfew violators. The average number of days between the last non-compliant July curfew check and the next arrest was 40 days for OSS probationers and 45 days for GTF probationers.

## **OSS-GTF Collateral Arrests**

“Collateral” arrests refer to arrests made by OSS or GTF officers that result in new charges that were unrelated to a curfew violation. These arrests usually result from special investigations that OSS-GTF teams conduct. In many cases collateral arrests involve persons who are not on probation themselves but who are associates of persons on probation and/or the OSS-GTF caseload.


OSS-GTF teams spend much of their time investigating leads provided to them by confidential informants. Initially, the investigations may involve questioning suspicious persons and determining whether they are on probation. If the person is found to be on probation, they may be interrogated about illegal activities that they may be aware of.

The July 2002 sample included 121 collateral arrests. Wilmington OSS officers made 39 collateral arrests and New Castle County GTF made 82 collateral arrests during this period. Thirty-five of the arrests noted on the contact forms could not be verified because the arrested person did not have a valid SBI number and/or their arrest record wasn't found on the state Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS). It is likely that some of these cases were investigated but no further action was taken. Eighty-six collateral arrests were verified by CJIS. The offenses that the collateral arrests were charged with are shown in Figure 11.

Thirty-four (40 percent) of the 86 verified collateral arrests involved active OSS or GTF probationers. Collateral arrestees who were active OSS-GTF probationers at the time of their arrest had more extensive criminal backgrounds than the average OSS or GTF probationer. Table 7 shows that the 34 OSS-GTF probationers in the sample who were arrested in a “collateral” arrest had an average of 26.2 total arrests and 3.8 drug arrests in their Delaware criminal histories. In comparison, the remaining OSS-GTF probationers in the sample had an average of 19.8 total arrests and 1.8 drug arrests in their criminal histories.



**Figure 11**  
**Arrest Charges for OSS and GTF Collateral Arrests**  
**Made in July 2003**



**Table 7: Arrest History Comparison of July 2002 Sample Cases**

Average number of arrests in Delaware criminal history records	OSS-GTF Probationer Curfew Check Arrests	OSS-GTF Probationer Collateral Arrests
Total Arrests per Offender	19.8	26.2
Title 11 Felony Arrests	3.4	4.6
Title 11 Violent Felony Arrests	1.5	1.9
Title 11 Weapon Arrests	0.6	1.4
Title 16 Arrests	1.8	3.8
Title 16 Violent Felony Arrests	1.0	2.7

## Detention bed usage associated with OSS-GTF

176 (55 percent) of the 323 persons investigated in the July 2002 sample were arrested between July and December 2002. Of the 176 arrested offenders, 127 (72 percent) were detained. Offenders in the sample who were arrested and detained at a Department of Correction facility between July and December 2002 are shown in Table 8. OSS-GTF probationers who complied with their July 2002 curfew were detained at a slightly higher rate than either non-compliant probationers or collateral arrests. Twenty-six of the 33 (79 percent) OSS-GTF probationers who were home at curfew were arrested and detained before year's end compared with 61 of the 86 (77 percent) collateral arrests and 40 of the 57 (70 percent) OSS-GTF probationers who missed curfew.

Collateral arrests were detained for longer periods than either compliant or non-compliant curfew check cases. The 127 detained offenders in the sample served a total of 4,421 detention bed days, or 12.1 beds. The average number of days detained overall was 35 days per offender. Collateral arrests were detained for an average of 44 days compared with 29 days for non-compliant curfew check cases and 22 days for compliant curfew check cases. Collateral arrests were responsible for 2,711 of the 4,421 (61 percent) detention bed days. Collateral arrests used more than double the number of beds compared with non-compliant curfew violators; 2,711 bed days versus 1,138. Likewise, curfew violators used just about double the number of detention days as did the curfew compliant cases; 1,138 bed days versus 572.

<b>Table 8: Days in Detention Served Between July and December 2002</b>			
	Persons Detained	Total Days Detained	Avg. Days Detained
All Detained Cases	127	4,421	34.8
Compliant Curfew Check Total	26	572	22.0
Non-Compliant Curfew Check Total	40	1,138	28.5
Collateral Arrests	61	2,711	44.4
<b>Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF Detention Detail</b>			
OSS Compliant	10	110	11.0
OSS Non-Compliant	20	481	24.1
OSS Collateral	23	1,399	60.8
GTF Compliant	16	462	28.9
GTF Non-Compliant	20	657	32.9
GTF Collateral	38	1,312	34.5

## Level V DOC bed usage associated with OSS-GTF

Table 9 shows the number of persons in the July 2002 sample who were arrested between July and December 2002 and were sentenced to Level V, the total number of days sentenced to Level V, and the average Level V sentence received per offender.

Forty-four of the 185 offenders in the sample who were arrested between July and December 2002 were sentenced to Level V (24 percent). The 44 offenders in the sample who were sentenced to Level V were responsible for a total of 18,699 DOC Level V sentenced bed days and received an average sentence of 424 days per offender. The 18,699 DOC bed days translates into 51.2 beds. If the experiences of OSS-GTF in July 2002 are representative of OSS-GTF activity in general, the annual DOC Level V bed need would be 612 beds.

Nearly half of the sample cases that were sentenced to Level V were collateral arrests. Collateral arrests received longer Level V sentences on average than OSS-GTF probationer arrests. The average Level V sentence for collateral arrests was 652 days compared with 261 days for non-compliant curfew arrests and 171 days for compliant probationer arrests.

Six offenders in the sample who received Level V sentences were sentenced to treatment (Key, Greentree or Boot Camp). Based on Department of Correction Key and Crest length-of-stay information, the number of days at Level V for offenders sentenced to Level V Treatment was estimated at 212 days.

<b>Table 9: July 2002 Sample Cases Sentenced to Level V</b>			
	Persons Sentenced to Level V	Days Sentenced to Level V	Avg. Level V Sentence (Days)
All Level V Sentences	44	18,699	425.0
Compliant Curfew Check Total	7	1,194	170.6
Non-Compliant Curfew Check Total	17	4,429	260.5
Collateral Arrests	20	13,046	652.3
<b>Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF Level V Detail</b>			
OSS Compliant	2	302	151.0
OSS Non-Compliant	10	3,181	318.1
OSS Collateral	11	8,468	769.8
GTF Compliant	5	892	178.4
GTF Non-Compliant	7	1,248	178.3
GTF Collateral	9	4,578	508.7

## DOC Bed Days

Offenders in the sample group who were arrested between July and December 2003 and occupied Department of Correction beds either while detained or after being sentenced to Level V are shown in Table 10. The 132 persons in the sample group used a total of 21,798 bed days/59.7 beds and remained in the custody of DOC for an average of 165 days per offender.

Collateral arrests represented 49 percent of sample cases who were in DOC custody but were responsible for 70 percent of the total bed days used. Collateral arrests were detained or sentenced to DOC beds for an average of 234 days compared with 120 days for non-compliant curfew probationers and 64 days for curfew compliant probationers. Collateral arrests made by Wilmington OSS remained in DOC custody for the longest periods. These cases were incarcerated for an average of 381 days.

<b>Table 10: DOC Bed Days Used by the July 2002 Sample Cases</b>			
	Persons Detained or Sentenced to Level V	Total DOC Bed Days	Avg. DOC Bed Days
Detained or Sentenced to Level V	132	21,798	165.1
Compliant Curfew Check Total	26	1,666	64.1
Non-Compliant Curfew Check Total	41	4,903	119.6
Collateral Arrests	65	15,229	234.3
<b>Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF DOC Bed Days Detail</b>			
OSS Compliant	10	391	39.1
OSS Non-Compliant	21	3,336	158.9
OSS Collateral	24	9,135	380.6
GTF Compliant	16	1,275	79.7
GTF Non-Compliant	20	1,567	78.4
GTF Collateral	41	6,094	148.6

## **Bed Impact of Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF**

There is little doubt that OSS-GTF curfew checks and special investigations have led to a significant increase in arrests. The preemptive nature of the arrests are at least partly responsible for decreasing violent and property crime rates, disruptions of illicit drug markets, and a general increase in public safety.

If all of the OSS-GTF arrests made in 2002 were processed through the criminal justice system in the same manner as were the July 2002 OSS-GTF in-depth study cases, the DOC bed impact would be 1,064. This full assessment of all 2002 OSS-GTF activity, referred to as **Scenario 1**, assumes that without OSS-GTF, none of these persons would have been arrested. Obviously, this would produce a DOC bed impact that is far too high. Many, but by no means all, of these persons would have still been arrested, detained, and sentenced even if OSS-GTF didn't exist.

A more realistic estimate of OSS-GTF's impact on DOC beds would have to take these factors into account. Therefore, the following two scenarios were devised to estimate what the impact of OSS-GTF would most likely be.

### **Scenario 2: High DOC Bed Impact = 667 Beds**

This estimate assumes that the probability that a person will be arrested and the seriousness of the crimes that they are arrested for are equal to that of the curfew compliant probationers in the July 2002 sample. As shown earlier in this report, persons in this group were arrested for less serious crimes and they received shorter Level V sentences. It is assumed that without OSS-GTF, many crimes, even if reported, would go unsolved and when the perpetrators were captured the crimes they were arrested for would be similar to the curfew compliant cases.

For instance, it is assumed that without OSS-GTF special investigations, only 32 percent of the "collateral" persons would have been arrested. It is further assumed that the types of crimes that they commit would be similar to those of the curfew complaint cases and that they would remain in a DOC facility for an average of 64 days. With these assumptions, the full DOC bed use would be 396 beds. Subtracting the 396 DOC beds that would have been used without OSS-GTF from the full 1,064 beds used under Scenario 1 yields an OSS-GTF DOC bed impact of 667 beds.

### **Scenario 3: Low DOC Bed Impact = 433 Beds**

Scenario 3 assumes that the probability of a person being arrested is no more likely than the curfew complaint OSS-GTF cases. In this scenario, however, the seriousness of the crimes that the persons are arrested for without OSS-GTF are just as serious as those that they were arrested for under OSS-GTF. Therefore, although fewer persons would be arrested without OSS-GTF, the crimes they were arrested for would be just as serious and the time detained or sentenced would remain the same.

For instance, the average time a collateral arrestee remains in either pre-trial detention or Level V sentenced status is 234 days under OSS-GTF. It is assumed that the collateral offenders that would have been arrested without OSS-GTF (although fewer) would also remain in DOC custody for 234 days. With these assumptions, the full DOC bed use would be 631 beds. Subtracting the 631 DOC beds that would have been used without OSS-GTF from the full impact bed usage of 1,064 beds yields a DOC bed impact of 433 beds under this scenario.

### **Details for Estimating the OSS-GTF DOC Bed Impact**

Using 2002 as the year of analysis, OSS-GTF activity statewide is estimated to have used 1,064 DOC detention or main institution beds, thereby accounting for 19.4 percent of the June 30, 2002 detention, jail, and prison population (Scenario 1: Baseline). This estimate assumes that without OSS-GTF none of the offenders would have been arrested, detained or sentenced to Level V. Clearly this is not the case.

Most of the offenders targeted by OSS-GTF have extensive criminal histories with an average of 19 prior arrests; 63 percent have been arrested for a Title 11 violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault); 67 percent have a prior arrest for illicit drugs; and 40 percent have a prior arrest for the use or illegal possession of a firearm or a dangerous weapon. Many of these offenders will eventually will be arrested and end up back in detention, jail and prison.

It is also clear that there is no fully valid way of knowing what the arrest, detention, and Level V sentencing patterns would have been for the OSS-GTF arrestees if OSS-GTF didn't exist. However to obtain a more accurate OSS-GTF bed impact estimate it is important to know what a "without OSS-GTF" baseline would be.

The July 2002 OSS-GTF sample cases for Wilmington and New Castle County provides a viable surrogate for a "without OSS-GTF" baseline. Arrest, detention, and sentencing patterns for curfew complaint OSS-GTF probationers are similar to what might have happened under normal policing without OSS-GTF. Curfew compliant probationers are less likely to be subject to intensive policing efforts that are applied to non-compliant probationers. Granted, the compliant curfew offenders may be subject to a somewhat more intense scrutiny than a regular Level III probationer. To the extent that complaint curfew offenders are arrested, detained, and incarcerated above what might be considered "normal" circumstances parallels the degree that the DOC bed estimates in this analysis are low. In other words, the DOC bed impact estimates in this analysis may undercount the actual DOC beds needed to accommodate OSS-GTF activity.

To assess the DOC bed impact three scenarios are used. Scenario 1 provides the baseline DOC bed impact. This scenario shows the combined need for detention and Level V incarceration beds for OSS-GTF offenders statewide in 2002. The results for this scenario show that 1,064 beds would be needed for all OSS-GTF cases if all of the violations and crimes for the OSS-GTF were unresolved.

## **Scenario 1: the OSS-GTF Baseline Bed Need Analysis**

Scenario 1 uses the 2002 statewide OSS-GTF summary statistics (compliant/non-compliant curfew checks and collateral arrests) as the baseline for calculating the DOC bed impact. The probability of arrests, the probability of being detained and/or incarcerated at Level V, and the length of stay once detained or incarcerated are based on the tracking study for the July 2002 OSS-GTF contacts.

Important parameters from the July 2002 OSS-GTF analysis include: 32 percent of the curfew compliant probationers were arrested within six months of the curfew compared with 42 percent non-compliant probationers; most non-compliant OSS-GTF probationers were arrested within 45 days after their missed curfew check; 79 percent of the of the curfew compliant OSS-GTF probationers were detained and/or incarcerated once arrested compared to 72 percent of the non-compliant OSS-GTF probationers; 76 percent of the collateral arrestees were detained following arrest; DOC lengths of stay are tiered in terms of severity—curfew compliant probationers who were arrested spend on average 64 days at DOC; non-compliant curfew violators stay almost twice as long at 120 days; and collateral arrestees stay in a DOC bed for the longest period, an average of 234 days.

Scenario 1 (see Table 11) shows that the 2002 OSS-GTF operation needs 1,064 DOC beds.

## **Scenario 2: What if there was no OSS-GTF and fewer persons were arrested, and they stayed in detention and/or jail for shorter periods of time?**

Scenario 2 provides a DOC bed impact that answers the question: what if there wasn't an OSS-GTF program and arrest rates for non-compliant curfew offenders and collateral arrestees were no higher than they would be under normal surveillance and policing practices (as estimated using the arrest rates for the compliant OSS-GTF persons)? In addition, Scenario 2 assumes that non-compliant curfew offenders and collateral cases would be arrested and prosecuted for less serious crimes, thus resulting in lengths of stay in detention and/or incarceration equal to non-compliant curfew offenders (64 days).

Scenario 2 (see Table 11) shows that under normal circumstances “without OSS-GTF”, the offenders involved would use 396 DOC beds and the bed impact of OSS-GTF is 667 DOC beds (1,064 used by OSS-GTF minus 396 used under normal circumstances).

**Scenario 3: What if there was no OSS-GTF and fewer persons arrested but they stayed in detention and/or jail for same periods of time?**

Scenario 3 also assumes that arrest rates for non-compliant curfew offenders and collateral arrestees were no higher than they would be under normal surveillance and policing practices (as estimated using the arrest rates for the compliant OSS-GTF persons), however, in this scenario non-compliant curfew offenders and collateral cases would be arrested and prosecuted for the same crimes as they were under OSS-GTF, thus resulting in lengths of stay in detention and/or incarceration equal to what they would have been under OSS-GTF, that is, 120 days for non-compliant curfew check offenders and 243 days for collateral arrests.

Scenario 3 (see Table 11) shows that without OSS-GTF, the offenders involved would use 631 DOC beds and the bed impact of OSS-GTF is 433 DOC beds (1,064 used by OSS-GTF minus 631 used under normal circumstances).



## Appendices

Table A  
 Operation Safe Streets/Governor's Task Force  
 Statewide Summary Statistics by Year  
 January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2003

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	Total
Total Curfew Checks <sup>1</sup>	5,894	7,660	8,392	8,046	8,094	38,086
Positive	3,825	4,771	5,491	4,999	5,049	24,135
Negative	2,069	2,889	2,901	3,047	3,053	13,959
Violation of Probation Arrests <sup>1</sup>	251	454	409	404	323	1,841
Collateral Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,019	956	949	1,106	1,466	5,496
Probationer In Program	184	130	98	79	91	582
Probationer Not In Program	332	231	130	198	220	1,111
Non-Probationer Arrests	151	211	302	389	302	1,355
Probationer - Status Unknown	352	384	419	440	853	2,448
Total OSS/GTF Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,270	1,410	1,358	1,510	1,789	7,337
Probationer In Program	435	584	507	483	414	2,423
Probationer Not In Program	332	231	130	198	220	1,111
Non-Probationer Arrests	151	211	302	389	302	1,355
Probationer - Status Unknown	352	384	419	440	853	2,448
Controlled Substances Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Cocaine (gm)	172.9	484.5	1,134.7	627.0	2,276.7	4,695.7
Crack (gm)	816.0	2,241.1	1,919.8	2,509.5	2,202.8	9,689.2
Hashish (gm)	0.0	104.3	3.5	3.2	0.0	111.0
Heroin (gm)	58.9	287.7	475.2	28.0	109.5	959.3
LSD (gm)	0.0	0.0	3.5	2.0	20.0	25.5
Marijuana (gm)	41,581.9	11,096.3	7,354.8	18,672.3	59,962.4	138,667.8
Methamphetamine (gm)	0.0	0.0	212.5	2.1	1.8	216.4
PCP (gm)	49.9	0.0	11.5	18.0	9.0	88.4
Items Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Recovered Stolen Property	\$67,252	\$141,369	\$106,993	\$75,962	\$128,532	\$520,108
U.S. Currency	\$294,131	\$174,840	\$272,870	\$288,282	\$369,360	\$1,399,483
Guns	52	64	54	87	107	364
Other Weapons	30	28	27	85	93	263

<sup>1</sup>Source: DOC Probation and Parole

<sup>2</sup>Source: Delaware State Police

<sup>3</sup>Source: Delaware State Police, Wilmington P.D., Dover P.D.

Table B  
 Operation Safe Streets/Governor's Task Force  
 Summary Statistics by Jurisdiction  
 January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2003

	Statewide	DSP NCC	DSP KC	DSP SC	WILM P.D.	DOV P.D.
Total Curfew Checks <sup>1</sup>	38,086	10,314	5,458	6,957	11,719	3,638
Positive	24,135	6,217	3,742	5,367	6,659	2,150
Negative	13,959	4,097	1,716	1,590	5,060	1,496
Violation of Probation Arrests <sup>1</sup>	1,841	238	316	716	443	128
Collateral Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	5,496	1,455	1,602	1,046	878	515
Probationer In Program	582	36	271	93	67	115
Probationer Not In Program	1,111	85	517	239	80	190
Non-Probationer Arrests	1,355	567	59	94	425	210
Probationer - Status Unknown	2,448	767	755	620	306	0
Total OSS/GTF Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	7,337	1,693	1,918	1,762	1,321	643
Probationer In Program	2,423	274	587	809	510	243
Probationer Not In Program	1,111	85	517	239	80	190
Non-Probationer Arrests	1,355	567	59	94	425	210
Probationer - Status Unknown	2,448	767	755	620	306	0
Controlled Substances Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Cocaine (gm)	4,695.7	2,939.3	446.6	855.0	177.9	276.9
Crack (gm)	9,689.2	2,078.5	711.4	1,365.9	3,277.8	2,255.6
Hashish (gm)	111.0	3.2	3.5	0.0	58.0	46.3
Heroin (gm)	959.3	52.0	8.2	22.6	873.5	3.0
LSD (gm)	25.5	25.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Marijuana (gm)	138,667.8	29,492.8	16,914.5	55,436.5	9,981.0	26,843.1
Methamphetamine (gm)	216.4	212.0	2.1	2.3	0.0	0.0
PCP (gm)	88.4	9.0	0.0	18.3	1.0	60.1
Items Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Recovered Stolen Property	\$520,108	\$247,677	\$80,351	\$14,500	\$177,580	\$0
U.S. Currency	\$1,399,483	\$522,650	\$182,206	\$135,869	\$336,517	\$222,241
Guns	364	146	41	57	83	37
Other Weapons	263	42	136	28	39	18

<sup>1</sup>Source: DOC Probation and Parole

<sup>2</sup>Source: Delaware State Police

<sup>3</sup>Source: Delaware State Police, Wilmington P.D., Dover P.D.

Table C  
 Operation Safe Streets/Governor's Task Force  
 Summary Statistics by Jurisdiction  
 January 1 to December 31, 2003

	Statewide	DSP NCC	DSP KC	DSP SC	WILM P.D.	DOV P.D.
Total Curfew Checks <sup>1</sup>	8,094	2,247	1,031	1,459	2,334	1,023
Positive	5,049	1,453	696	1,124	1,153	623
Negative	3,053	794	335	335	1,181	408
Violation of Probation Arrests <sup>1</sup>	323	31	56	146	64	26
Collateral Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,466	363	549	210	239	105
Probationer In Program	91	0	50	20	0	21
Probationer Not In Program	220	0	116	58	0	46
Non-Probationer Arrests	302	135	5	2	122	38
Probationer - Status Unknown	853	228	378	130	117	0
Total OSS/GTF Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,789	394	605	356	303	131
Probationer In Program	414	31	106	166	64	47
Probationer Not In Program	220	0	116	58	0	46
Non-Probationer Arrests	302	135	5	2	122	38
Probationer - Status Unknown	853	228	378	130	117	0
Controlled Substances Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Cocaine (gm)	2,276.7	1,536.5	332.7	119.1	61.5	226.9
Crack (gm)	2,202.8	413.1	263.1	138.9	779.6	608.2
Hashish (gm)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Heroin (gm)	109.5	27.4	3.4	20.7	55.4	2.6
LSD (doses)	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Marijuana (gm)	59,962.4	12,175.3	6,369.4	37,934.9	2,461.6	1,021.3
Methamphetamine (gm)	1.8	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0
PCP (vials)	9.0	8.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
Items Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Recovered Stolen Property	\$128,532	\$49,882	\$16,550	\$0	\$62,100	\$0
U.S. Currency	\$369,360	\$176,468	\$52,130	\$42,990	\$61,905	\$35,867
Guns	107	54	17	6	21	9
Other Weapons	93	9	81	1	2	0

<sup>1</sup>Source: DOC Probation and Parole

<sup>2</sup>Source: Delaware State Police

<sup>3</sup>Source: Delaware State Police, Wilmington P.D., Dover P.D.

Table D  
 Operation Safe Streets/Governor's Task Force  
 Summary Statistics by Jurisdiction  
 January 1 to December 31, 2002

	Statewide	DSP NCC	DSP KC	DSP SC	WILM P.D.	DOV P.D.
Total Curfew Checks <sup>1</sup>	8,046	2,242	1,100	1,439	2,509	756
Positive	4,999	1,343	781	1,131	1,277	467
Negative	3,047	899	319	308	1,232	289
Violation of Probation Arrests <sup>1</sup>	404	36	52	192	102	22
Collateral Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,106	330	272	198	241	65
Probationer In Program	79	0	45	23	0	11
Probationer Not In Program	198	0	92	79	0	27
Non-Probationer Arrests	389	202	10	21	129	27
Probationer - Status Unknown	440	128	125	75	112	0
Total OSS/GTF Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,510	366	324	390	343	87
Probationer In Program	483	36	97	215	102	33
Probationer Not In Program	198	0	92	79	0	27
Non-Probationer Arrests	389	202	10	21	129	27
Probationer - Status Unknown	440	128	125	75	112	0
Controlled Substances Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Cocaine (gm)	627.0	352.6	41.5	232.8	0.0	0.1
Crack (gm)	2,509.5	445.8	105.4	510.9	607.2	840.2
Hashish (gm)	3.2	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Heroin (gm)	28.0	11.5	4.8	0.0	11.2	0.4
LSD (gm)	2.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Marijuana (gm)	18,672.3	7,321.5	3,047.4	1,728.7	3,731.3	2,843.4
Methamphetamine (gm)	2.1	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
PCP (gm)	18.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	0.0	0.0
Items Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Recovered Stolen Property	\$75,962	\$18,832	\$17,650	\$10,000	\$29,480	\$0
U.S. Currency	\$288,282	\$110,701	\$39,365	\$30,454	\$45,034	\$62,728
Guns	87	37	7	12	20	11
Other Weapons	85	5	35	21	21	3

<sup>1</sup>Source: DOC Probation and Parole

<sup>2</sup>Source: Delaware State Police

<sup>3</sup>Source: Delaware State Police, Wilmington P.D., Dover P.D.

Table E  
 Operation Safe Streets/Governor's Task Force  
 Summary Statistics by Jurisdiction  
 January 1 to December 31, 2001

	Statewide	DSP NCC	DSP KC	DSP SC	WILM P.D.	DOV P.D.
Total Curfew Checks <sup>1</sup>	8,392	2,252	1,366	1,479	2,597	698
Positive	5,491	1,306	939	1,191	1,645	410
Negative	2,901	946	427	288	952	288
Violation of Probation Arrests <sup>1</sup>	409	69	56	169	94	21
Collateral Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	949	216	251	275	107	100
Probationer In Program	98	0	68	8	0	22
Probationer Not In Program	130	0	77	31	0	22
Non-Probationer Arrests	302	163	2	15	66	56
Probationer - Status Unknown	419	53	104	221	41	0
Total OSS/GTF Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,358	285	307	444	201	121
Probationer In Program	507	69	124	177	94	43
Probationer Not In Program	130	0	77	31	0	22
Non-Probationer Arrests	302	163	2	15	66	56
Probationer - Status Unknown	419	53	104	221	41	0
Controlled Substances Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Cocaine (gm)	1,134.7	742.5	30.4	322.6	28.4	10.9
Crack (gm)	1,919.8	609.6	52.0	357.5	577.9	322.7
Hashish (gm)	3.5	0.0	3.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Heroin (gm)	475.2	5.8	0.0	1.9	467.5	0.0
LSD (gm)	3.5	3.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Marijuana (gm)	7,354.8	2,823.6	796.2	1,164.9	1,901.3	668.8
Methamphetamine (gm)	212.5	212.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
PCP (gm)	11.5	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	10.2
Items Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Recovered Stolen Property	\$106,993	\$74,993	\$32,000	\$0	\$0	\$0
U.S. Currency	\$272,870	\$158,110	\$5,117	\$15,971	\$61,623	\$32,049
Guns	54	16	8	11	13	6
Other Weapons	27	9	6	3	1	8

<sup>1</sup>Source: DOC Probation and Parole

<sup>2</sup>Source: Delaware State Police

<sup>3</sup>Source: Delaware State Police, Wilmington P.D., Dover P.D.

Table F  
 Operation Safe Streets/Governor's Task Force  
 Summary Statistics by Jurisdiction  
 January 1 to December 31, 2000

	Statewide	DSP NCC	DSP KC	DSP SC	WILM P.D.	DOV P.D.
Total Curfew Checks <sup>1</sup>	7,660	2,007	1,064	1,337	2,471	781
Positive	4,771	1,171	707	1,000	1,470	423
Negative	2,889	836	357	337	1,001	358
Violation of Probation Arrests <sup>1</sup>	454	55	72	164	128	35
Collateral Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	956	262	262	181	124	127
Probationer In Program	130	8	61	16	15	30
Probationer Not In Program	231	29	107	32	20	43
Non-Probationer Arrests	211	55	6	43	53	54
Probationer - Status Unknown	384	170	88	90	36	0
Total OSS/GTF Arrests <sup>1,2</sup>	1,410	317	334	345	252	162
Probationer In Program	584	63	133	180	143	65
Probationer Not In Program	231	29	107	32	20	43
Non-Probationer Arrests	211	55	6	43	53	54
Probationer - Status Unknown	384	170	88	90	36	0
Controlled Substances Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Cocaine (gm)	484.5	283.6	28.7	82.4	88.1	1.7
Crack (gm)	2,241.1	422.5	240.7	145.9	1,089.6	342.4
Hashish (gm)	104.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	58.0	46.3
Heroin (gm)	287.7	2.1	0.0	0.0	285.6	0.0
LSD (gm)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Marijuana (gm)	11,096.3	5,142.5	2,743.5	778.2	1,336.0	1,096.1
Methamphetamine (gm)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PCP (gm)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Items Seized <sup>3</sup>						
Recovered Stolen Property	\$141,369	\$50,869	\$0	\$4,500	\$86,000	\$0
U.S. Currency	\$174,840	\$50,588	\$4,596	\$23,954	\$37,396	\$58,306
Guns	64	16	4	15	22	7
Other Weapons	28	4	7	1	15	1

<sup>1</sup>Source: DOC Probation and Parole

<sup>2</sup>Source: Delaware State Police

<sup>3</sup>Source: Delaware State Police, Wilmington P.D., Dover P.D.

## Research Notes

The analysis presented in this report uses four sources of data. The first source is a computerized database of Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF admission and case management information that is maintained by the Delaware Department of Correction probation and parole office in Wilmington. It contains demographic information on probationers admitted to OSS-GTF, admission and discharge dates, and the reasons for closing out OSS-GTF cases.

The second source of data was the Delaware Department of Correction's paper files of OSS and GTF contacts. A one month sample of OSS and GTF cases were pulled from the archived contact forms that OSS-GTF probation officers fill out to document each curfew check, arrest, or other type of contact made with a probationer or suspect during the course of their shift. The contact forms include personal information on the individual (Name, Address, Date of Birth, and SBI number), whether the probationer was home at curfew, whether the person was arrested, and whether the contact involved an administrative warrant or administrative search.

The third source of data was provided by New Castle County Superior Court in the form of a letter from Judge Herlihy dated December 29, 2003. The letter described how OSS-GTF cases were handled in New Castle County Superior Court and provided an estimate of the number of OSS and GTF cases that were disposed by the court in 2002.

Finally, OSS-GTF operations were observed in the field by the primary researcher for this study, who accompanied the Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF police/probation officer teams for two shifts during the summer of 2003.

<sup>1</sup>The calculation for the "VOP only" count attributable to OSS-GTF is based on the July 2002 sample. Probation arrests in July 2002 equal 38 for curfew checks. The annual estimate for Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF equals 456. The statewide estimate would be  $456 * 1.41$  or 643. Add in the 6 percent for collateral VOP where the VOP is the only charge.  $5.2 * 12 = 62.4 * 1.41 = 88$  is the estimate for VOP "only" from the collateral arrests. Therefore,  $643 + 88 = 731$  is the statewide VOP "only" estimate (not including fast track cases). The number of OSS-GTF detained equals: 75 percent detention rate for OSS-GTF VOPs = 550/ 3600 or about 15 percent of the detentions for VOP in 2000. Plus add in fast tracks, etc.

<sup>2</sup>The Wilmington OSS and New Castle County GTF annual estimate for the arrest for curfew violators is 899. Without the warrant or capias for the failed curfew, it is estimated that 209 fewer curfew violators would be arrested in a year (899 estimated annual minus the 690 that would have been arrested without OSS-GTF See differences between Scenario 1 and 2). About 138 of the 209 "extra" arrests are by a Wilmington or New Castle County OSS-GTF team. The remaining 71 "extra" arrests are related to the issuance of an OSS-GTF administrative warrants or capias that are later executed through standard police work. In total it is estimated the chance of arrest for a OSS-GTF failed curfew check is about 10 percentage points or 30 percent higher than if there was not a administrative warrant issued ( $.42$  non-compliant/ $.32$  compliant = 1.3125).